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NOTES 
Class Actions for Punitive Damages 
INTRODUCTION 
Two recent decisions, In re Federal Skywalk Cases (Federal 
Skywalk Cases) 1 and In re: Northern .District of Cal!fornia ".Dalkon 
Shield" IU.D Products Liability Litigation (.Dalkon Shield)2 have 
raised the question whether a federal court can certify a class action 
for punitive damages under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 The trial courts in both of these cases theorized that 
where a defendant4 has injured numerous plaintiffs, the risk of mul-
tiple punitive damages judgments would produce one of two unde-
sirable results. First, courts fearing that punitive awards already had 
severely punished a given defendant might refuse to award punitive 
damages to later plaintiffs. Thus, the first plaintiffs to bring their 
claims to judgment would dispose of the right of later plaintiffs to 
seek punitive awards.5 Alternatively, courts would allow plaintiffs to 
pursue their punitive claims in every action, thus subjecting defend-
ants to multiple punitive awards and the risk of bankruptcy.6 In 
either instance, the fund available for punitive recovery would be 
limited, establishing a basis for class certification under Rule 
23(b)(l).7 
1. 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 
(1982). The action arose from the collapse of two skywalks in the Hyatt-Regency Hotel in 
Kansas City, Missouri on July 17, 1981. The disaster left 113 dead and 212 injured. 1500 to 
2000 persons who were in the lobby of the hotel when the accident occured were in a position 
to seek damages for emotional distress. By January 25, 1982, 150 suits had been filed either in 
the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri or the Circuit Court of Jackson 
County, Missouri. The federal district court certified a Rule 23(b)(l)(A) class action on the 
issue of liability for compensatory and punitive damages, and a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action 
on the issues of liability for and amount of punitive damages. 93 F.R.D. at 419. 
2. 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacatedandremandedsubnom. Abed v. A.H. Robins 
Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). Thousands of women 
allegedly had been injured by a defective IUD called the Dalkon Shield. The device produced 
uterine perforations, infections, spontaneous abortions, and fetal injuries. The district court 
certified a nationwide class action consisting of plaintiffs seeking punitive damages against 
A.H. Robins Co. 526 F. Supp. at 921. 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
4. Although this Note refers throughout to a single defendant, the reasoning involved also 
applies where several defendants injure numerous plaintiffs. In addition, this Note assumes 
that most tortfeasors will be corporations because most of the cases dealing with the problem 
of multiple litigation for punitive damages involve corporate defendants. 
5, Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424; IJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898, 918. 
6, Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 424; IJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 897. 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l); see Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 419; IJalkon Shield, 
526 F. Supp. at 896-900. 
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The Ninth Circuit vacated the certification order in '.Dalkon 
Shield, holding that the class was not maintainable under the pre-
requisites of Rule 23(a).8 The Eighth Circuit vacated class certifica-
tion .in Federal Skywalk Cases on the ground that the district court's 
order violated the Anti-Injunction Act9 by enjoining pending state 
court proceedings.10 
Nevertheless, the problems caused when numerous plaintiffs seek 
punitive damages against a defendant justify the use of Rule 23. Pu-
nitive awards are often quite high in individual actions where such 
damages are sought,11 and potential liability soars when many plain-
tiffs seek punitive damages. 12 Moreover, incidents giving rise to 
mass actions for punitive damages are likely to occur in the future. 13 
This Note argues that a Rule 23 class action offers the best way to 
manage multiple actions for punitive damages. 14 It begins by exam-
8. 693 F.2d at 851. The court observed that it was "not necessarily ruling out the class 
action tool as a means for expediting multi-party product liability actions in appropriate cases, 
but the combined difficulties overlapping from each of the elements of Rule 23(a) preclude[d] 
certification in this case." 693 F.2d at 851. 
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976); see part III infra. 
10. 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). 
11. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; see, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal, 
App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (jury verdict for $125 million in punitive damages 
reduced to $3.5 million by trial court); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 660 n.2, 
437 N.E.2d 910, 914 n.2 (1982) (citing a $10.5 million punitive award in California and an 
$850,000 punitive award in the MER/29 drug liability litigation in New York); K. REDDEN, 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.2(A)(2), at 82-83 (1980) (reporting that each of 40 cases handled by a 
Chicago firm in the MER/29 drug liability litigation sought $500,000 in punitive damages); 
Belli, Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present Day Society, 49 
U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 1, 1 n.l (1980); Note,Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 
30 HAsTINGS LJ. 1797, 1797 n.6 (1979). 
12. ''When all of the litigation concerning these issues is concluded, punitive totals may 
reach staggering levels given the volatile nature of the claims involved and the amount of 
compensatory damages prayed for." Putz & Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of Class Members 
Who Opt Out: Should They Survive?, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1981); cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving 
how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be 
so administered as to avoid overkill."). 
In Dalkon Shield, the total of multiple punitive claims against defendant A.H. Robins ex• 
ceeded three billion dollars. 526 F. Supp. at 888; see also In re: Northern Dist. of Cal. 
"Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order 
conditionally certifying class action). Prior to the court's conditional certification, defendant 
A.H. Robins had already lost two jury verdicts on punitive damages, one for $75,000 and the 
other for $6.2 million. 521 F. Supp. at 1193. Similarly, plaintiffs in Federal Skywalk Cases 
sought a total of over $1 billion in compensatory damages and $500 million in punitive dam-
ages. 93 F.R.D. at 419. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at AS, col. 1 (Midwest ed.) (reporting 
450 lawsuits arising out of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, in which plaintiffs 
claimed a total of $600 million in compensatory and $2 billion in punitive damages). 
13. "In a complex society such as ours, the phenomenon of numerous persons suffering the 
same or similar injuries as a result of a single pattern of misconduct on the part of a defendant 
is becoming increasingly frequent." Da/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 892. The trend favors an 
award of punitive damages in such cases. See 526 F. Supp. at 900; K. REDDEN, supra note 11, 
§ 4.2(A)(2), at 85-86. 
14. Punitive damages pose a greater risk of producing a limited fund than compensatory 
damages do for three reasons. First, punitive recovery may be limited by law in situations 
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ining the policy underlying punitive damages and the plaintiffs in-
terest in recovering them. It then explains why a limited fund is 
created when courts deny punitive damage recovery as a matter of 
law or when punitive claims exceed defendant's as~ets. The Note 
contends that a Rule 23(b)(l)(B)15 class action provides the best 
means to manage this limited fund and reviews the circumstances in 
which a district court may properly certify a class action for punitive 
damages. It then examines the consequences of (b)(l)(B) certifica-
tion and concludes that a class action provides the best way to pro-
tect the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the judicial system. 
The Note concludes by explaining why principles of federalism do 
not preclude class certification orders that effectively enjoin pending 
state court proceedings. 
l. CLASS ACTIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. The Plaint!fis Interest in Recovering Punitive .Damages 
The law exacts punitive damages to deter16 and punish 17 culpable 
defendants. 18 Punitive damages are a windfall to the plaintiff, ex-
acted for society's benefit and not for individual compensation. 19 
Consequently, the plaintiff has no right to recover punitive damages; 
they are awarded at the discretion of. the trier of fact.20 
where compensatory awards will not be. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text. Alter-
natively, punitive damages awards may be as high as jury discretion and the court allow. See 
note 20 infra and accompanying text. Because of their size, punitive damages are more likely 
than compensatory damages to threaten a defendant's assets and thus to create a limited fund. 
See notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text. Third, while compensatory recovery alone 
may not threaten a defendant's financial solvency, punitive and compensatory damages to-
gether might do so. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.RD. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on 
other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); notes 31-40 infra 
and accompanying text. Thus, punitive damages create problems that warrant special consid-
eration. 
In some cases, compensatory damages alone may produce a limited fund. If so, a court can 
use the analysis presented in this Note to determine whether certification of a (b)(l)(B) class 
for compensatory damages is appropriate. As far as justification for certification is concerned, 
however, this Note restricts itself to the special dilemmas of punitive damages. 
15. FED. R. CN. P. 23(b)(l)(B). 
16. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; D. DOBBS, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205 (1973); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.13, 
at 130; Note, Punitive .Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of 
Overkill, 13 PAC. L.J. 1273, 1277 (1982). 
17. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 23-24. 
18. Misconduct coupled with malice usually describes a case for punitive damages. Ex-
treme misconduct indicating conscious or criminal indifference to the safety of others will also 
render a defendant liable for punitive damages. See D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 205. 
19. E.g., .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS, § 2, at 13 (4th ed. 1971); Morris, Punitive .Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv 
1173, 1177 n.7 (1931); Note, supra note 11, at 1808. 
20. E.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 
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Nevertheless, two considerations require a court to protect a 
plaintiff's interest in seeking21 punitive damages. First, fairness de-
mands that each plaintiff have an equal opportunity to sue for puni-
tive damages. If the fund available for recovery is limited, the court 
should manage the litigation so that it does not "become an un-
seemly race to the courtroom door with monetary prizes for a few 
winners and worthless judgments for the rest."22 Second, each plain-
tiff has a practical interest in the recovery of punitive damages. Such 
awards often provide a plaintiff with the means to defray litigation 
expenses,23 especially attorney's fees.24 A plaintiff unable to seek pu-
nitive damages might not sue at all;25 moreover, because attorneys 
often handle claims on the basis of contingent fees,26 punitive dam-
ages may provide the only way to make a claimant whole.27 Thus, 
while punitive damages are not designed to compensate the plain-
tiff,28 their availability may as a practical matter be dispositive of the 
effectiveness of a plaintiff's suit. 
at 898-99; Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, in THE CASE 
AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); Morris, supra note 19, at 
1189. 
21, In Dalkon Shield, for example, the court observed that "[p]laintiffs have no right to, or 
vested interest in, punitive damages. Plaintiffs do, however, have a right to seek punitive dam-
ages. It is this right to seek that the consequences of individual actions will impair." 526 F. 
Supp. at 898 n.37 (emphasis in original). 
22. Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 
93 F.R.D. 415,424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). 
23. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.2(A)(2), at 84; see Duffy, supra note 20, at 5. 
24. W. PROSSER,supra note 19, § 2, at II, 13; K. REDDEN,supra note II,§ 4.2(A)(2), at 84. 
In states that authorize punitive damages, many courts permit juries to consider plaintiffs 
litigation expenses, including attorney fees, in fixing the amount of punitive damages. Because 
this practice goes to punishment and not compensation, it does not violate the American rule 
against the award of attorney's fees. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.8, at 197; see, e.g., Cox v. 
Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972); Brewer v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 200 Kan. 96, 
434 P.2d 828 (1967); Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970). 
25. See Roginsky v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967); State ex rel. 
Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980); D. DOBBS,supra note 16, § 3.9, at 
205; K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.4, at 37; Putz & Astiz, supra note 12, at 4. 
26. See R. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS 75, 77 (Federal Judicial 
Center 1980); INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CONTINGENT FEES IN PERSONAL IN-
JURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (1957); J, MCGINN, 
LAWYERS: A CLIENT'S MANUAL 65 (1979). 
27. Contingent fee financing may impose a Hobson's choice on a plaintiff, forcing her 
either to surrender a percentage of her recovery or to relinquish all hope of being made whole. 
See R. ARONSON, supra note 26, at 77-78 (citing J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 50 (1976)). 
The lawyer's share of the recovery may in some cases prevent the plaintiff from being fully 
compensated. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 64-65 (1964). By 
increasing plaintiffs total recovery, and thus the share that plaintiff receives after deduction of 
attorney's fees, punitive damages improve her chances of being made whole. 
28. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
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B. The Limited Fund 
Multiple punitive damage actions injure a plaintifrs interest in 
one of two ways. First, early punitive judgments may lead a court to 
rule that a defendant has been punished enough, thus depriving later 
plaintiffs of any p:umtive recovery.29 Alternatively, courts will not 
limit recovery, in which case multiple individual awards may ex-
haust the assets available for recovery by later plaintiffs.30 Both re-
sults produce a limited fund in which all plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages have an interest. 
I. Limited Fund Created by A .Defendant's Bankruptcy 
A limited fund will most likely appear when plaintifrs multiple 
punitive claims exceed defendant's assets. Although some courts 
have indicated a desire to limit punitive damages when many plain-
tiffs sue few defendants,31 most authorities state that the courts can-
not effectively control multiple punitive damages claims. 32 This 
inability to limit the total amount of punitive damages awarded 
against a particular defendant increases the risk that the defendant 
will be bankrupted,33 especially since insurance usually does not 
29. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text. 
30. See notes 31-40 infra and accompanying text. 
31. JJa/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898; see also deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 
1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970) (the court balanced potential burdens of punitive damage liability 
against doubtful improvement in enforcement of securities laws and refused to allow punitive 
damages in private action under Rule l0b-5); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 
1276, 1285-87 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (extent of punitive liability an 
element of court's decision not to allow punitive damages under§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)); Roginsk.y v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 842 (2d Cir. 
1967) (where consequences of punitive damages were great, proof of punitive damages was 
subject to special scrutiny). Although the Roginsky court ostensibly found that punitive dam-
ages could not be awarded under New York's gross negligence standard, 378 F.2d at 851, its 
holding may have been motivated by concern about punitive damage overkill. See K. RED-
DEN, supra note 11, § 4.2(A)(2), at 83. 
32. The court in Roginsk.y v. Richard-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), observed 
that "[w]e know ofno principle whereby the first punitive award exhausts all claims for puni-
tive damages and would thus preclude future judgments • . . . Neither does it seem either fair 
or practicable to limit punitive recoveries to an indeterminate number of first-comers, leaving 
it to some unascertained court to cry, 'Hold, enough,' in the hope that others would follow." 
378 F.2d at 839-40; accord deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. · 
1970); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 913 (1970); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980). · 
Similarly, the district court in Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on 
other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), stated that it would 
be "utter naivete" not to conclude that many punitive damages suits would be tried. 93 F.R.D. 
at 423. This result is especially likely in a state that requires mutuality of estoppel, because an 
action between one plaintiff and defendant would not preclude the punitive damage issue for 
subsequent plaintiffs. See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 392 (D. Mass. 1979). 
33. deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus v. Law 
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Roginsky 
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1967); Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 
F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 898-99 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and 
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cover a defendant's punitive liability.34 
The specter of bankruptcy is far more worrisome than a limited 
fund created by refusing to award punitive damages to plaintiffs. A 
fund limited by legal restrictions compromises only the plaintiff's in-
terest in recovery. In contrast, bankruptcy harms the plaintiffs, the 
defendant, the defendant's creditors, the defendant's employees and 
society in general. First, it affects the interest of plaintiffs whose 
claims come to judgment after the defendant goes bankrupt.35 It 
does so by preventing late-suing plaintiffs from seeking punitive 
damages, thus depriving them of a legally protected interest.36 
Moreover, defendant's bankruptcy bars the compensatory recovery 
of late-suing plaintiffs, thus compromising their legal right to be 
made whole.37 Second, society suffers because constructive bank-
ruptcy may destroy an otherwise socially valuable defendant who is 
responsible for a single egregious error.38 Finally, bankruptcy in-
remanded sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 103 S. 
Ct. 817 (1983); Fround v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 659-60, 437 N.E.2d 910, 914-15 
(1982) (Sullivan, P.J., specially concurring); D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9 at 212; Morris, 
supra note 19, at 1195; see Note, supra note 16, at 1273 n.3. 
34. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187 n.10 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Logan, Liability Insurance Protection From Punilve Dam-
ages in THE CASE AGAINST PuNITIVE DAMAGES 24-25 (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969). 
Some states prohibit recovery as a matter of public policy, reasoning that if punitive damages 
are to deter a potential tortfeasor, they must come from this pocket and not the insurer's, K. 
REDDEN,supra note 11, § 4.13, at l30;see W. PROSSER,supra note 19, § 2, at 13; Logan,supra, 
at 25; see also Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483, 484 (1982) (remand) ("The insurance 
carriers contend that their policies with the defendants do not provide coverage for punishable 
acts .... "). The few states that do allow coverage do so only if the insurance contract so 
provides. K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.13, at 130; Logan, supra, at 24. 
35. Although a bankruptcy court can distribute a defendant's assets in a way designed to 
protect all creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (Supp. V 1981), the bankruptcy trustee would not be able 
to avoid payment of a judgment disbursed more than ninety days before the date that 
defendant filed in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(Supp. V. 198l);see Note, Class Cerly'ica-
lion in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(b}(I), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1157 n.62 (1983). 
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code would not prevent early plaintiffs from racing to the courthouse in 
order to receive a punitive damages windfall at the expense of late-suing claimants. 
More important, however, is the fact that "it is very difficult to collect anything from one 
who has gone bankrupt." D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE§ 304 (1978); see 
note 55 infra. This Note argues that once a defendant has been driven into bankruptcy, the 
disadvantages that a class action can control have already accrued. 
36. The court in Dalkon Shield noted that 1,573 claims aggregating over 2.3 billion dollars 
in punitive damages had been filed against defendant A.H. Robins. The court continued: 
"The potential for the constructive bankruptcy of A.H. Robins, a company whose net worth is 
$280,394,000.00, raises the unconscionable possibility that large numbers of plaintiffs who are 
not first in line at the courthouse door will be deprived of a practical means of redress." 526 F. 
Supp. at 893. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text. 
37. D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 212 ("heavy, multiple, and uncoordinated" punitive 
awards might exhaust defendant's assets and deprive later claimants of compensatory 
recovery). 
38. The court in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), stated 
that "a sufficiently egregious error as to one product can end the business life of a concern that 
has wrought much good in the past and might otherwise have continued to do so in the future, 
with many innocent stockholders suffering extinction of their investments for a single manage-
ment sin." 378 F.2d at 841; see also Note, supra note 11, at 1797. Punitive damages should 
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jures employees,39 shareholders, consumers, and creditors who ulti-
mately bear the burden of a corporate defendant's tortious error.40 
2. Limited Fund Created by Legal Restrictions on the Award of 
Punitive .Damages 
A limited fund also exists when the law prevents some or all 
plaintiffs from recovering punitive damages. This result occurs in 
two situations. First, state lawn might limit the number of punitive 
recoveries against a given defendant,42 in which case a court would 
allow only the first verdict-winning plaintiff to recover punitive dam-
ages.43 This outcome disposes of the interest that later plaintiffs have 
"sting, not kill, a defendant." .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 899; accord Maxey v. 
Freightliner, 450 F. Supp. 955, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), modi-
fied, 665 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1982); Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chem. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226, 
232 (M.D. Fla. 1974); International Union of Operating Engrs. v. Lassiter, 295 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,618 P.2d 1268, 1271 (1980). 
The punitive award should deter the potential tortfeasor by making any contemplated wrong 
unprofitable. In the area of products liability, for example, a "well-calibrated punitive award 
might make the producer perfect the product ..•. " Note, supra note 11, at 1799. Inasmuch 
as the law's goal is to deter and not to destroy tortfeasors,see note l6supra and accompanying 
text, courts should administer punitive damages awards both to preserve and deter culpable 
defendants. 
39. Even if the defendant does not or cannot file for bankruptcy, jobs may be lost. See 
Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tori Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1983) ("Manville might be forced to liquidate in full or in part and 
thereby to eliminate a large number of jobs."). 
40. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. 
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). If stockholders 
do not bear the burden, the costs ofpunitve damages will probably be passed on to consumers. 
See D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 213. 
41. Because the measure of damages is a substantive issue, state law governs the measure 
of damages in diversity cases. D. DoBBS,supra note 16, § 1.4, at 12. A federal court weighing 
the merits of a diversity class action must apply the punitive law of the state in which it sits. 
See Northwestern Natl. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); In re Paris Air 
Crash of March 3, 1974, 427 F. Supp. 701, 704 (C.D. Cal. 1977), revd, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 
1980). 
42. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424-25 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 
680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). The court noted that Missouri law 
might allow only one award of punitive damages against a single defendant. Despite the 
court's fears, and the possibility that future laws will limit the number of punitive judgments, 
no jurisdiction "has considered and adopted the one bite/first comer approach to punitive 
damages." State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1980). 
If a state court does so hold, the state's substantive interest in the distribution of the judg-
ment might preclude an alternative distributional scheme. That is, if state law stipulated that 
only one plaintiff could recover a punitive judgment, the state's substantive interest in deter-
mining who may recover could prevent a federal court sitting in diversity from distributing a 
judgment to multiple plaintiffs. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); note 41 supra. 
If, on the other hand, the state allowed only one judgment but did not specify to whom it must 
be awarded, a distribution of the judgment would arguably be a procedural question within 
the power of the federal court. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
43. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 898 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). 
1794 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1787 
in seeking punitive recovery. 
Second, a court may refuse to award punitive damages to later 
plaintiffs if it decides that previous individual judgments have suffi-
ciently punished a defendant for a particular o.ffense,44 or that the 
risk of financially destroying the defendant is unacceptable.45 If one 
or more courts so held, plaintiffs bringing suit in those courts would 
be denied their interest in seeking punitive damages. 
C. Potential Means To Control Punitive Awards 
Given that most courts will allow punitive damages where many 
plaintiffs sue a single defendant,46 the next question is whether a 
44. [T]he existence of conflicting interests among plaintiffs as to a limited punitive dam-
age "fund" is a conceptual certainty . . . • [I)t requires no clairvoyant power to conclude 
that judges in subsequently filed lawsuits will rule as a matter of law that the defendants 
have been punished enough and dismiss a plaintitrs claim for exemplary damages. 
JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 918; accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483,487 (1982) 
(remand) ("Missouri law, at the very least, does not permit undiminished multiple punitive 
damage awards."). 
45. See note 31 supra. 
46. Many co=entators have made a plausible case for the abolition of punitive damages. 
See generally THE CASE AGAINST PuNITIVE DAMAGES (D. Hirsch & J. Pouros eds. 1969); K. 
REDDEN,supra note 11, §§ 7.4-7.8; Note,supra note 11, at 1802 nn.27-30. More recently, com-
mentary has called for the curtailment of punitive damages, limiting their availability to cer-
tain narrowly defined categories of tortious behavior. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in 1/1e 
Law of Punitive JJamages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. l (1982); see also Wheeler, The Consliluliona/ 
Case for Reforming Punitive JJamages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983). 
The contrary argument defends punitive damages as essential to compensate plaintiffs and 
to deter defendants. Where the defendant enjoys greater resources than the plaintiff, the pros-
pect of punitive liability serves as an important equalizer in settlement negotiations. Punitive 
damages also help defray actual litigation expenses, bringing the plaintitrs ultimate compensa-
tion closer to the value of the damages sustained. See notes 23-27 supra and accompanying 
text. 
Some authorities have also argued that mere compensatory damages are insufficient to 
deter corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 
812, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 (1981) (condemning auto manufacturer's "cost-benefit analysis 
balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits"); Morris, supra note 19, at 1185, 
1187; Owen,Punilive JJamages in Products Liability Litigation, 14 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1323-24 
(1976). This argument amounts to an attack on the accuracy of compensatory damage awards, 
rather than a claim for deterrence beyond the value of the injuries actually caused by tortious 
conduct. Contemporary tort theory in fact favors "cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives 
and limbs against corporate profits," for this process offers the only method of reaching the 
optimal level of risk. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); w. BLUM & H. 
KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM (1965); R. EPSTEIN, MOD-
ERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 
1977); Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 
U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975); Fletcher,Fairnessand l/tilityin Tori Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1972); Posner,A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). Punitive damages beyond 
the losses actually sustained would, if effectively awarded, overdeter legitimate economic ac-
tivity. But all this assumes an accurate measurement of the economic value of life and limb, a 
measurement fraught with uncertainties and arrived at by different juries in different ways. 
See, e.g., Zeckhauser & Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PRODS. 5 
(1976). Punitive damages may serve the critical function of enabling juries to assess more 
accurately the extent to which society will impose the value of life as a constraint on economic 
activity. 
All but four states - Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington - allow puni-
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court should attempt to limit the total punitive award against a given 
defendant. As a practical matter, courts are not likely to control ef-
fectively multiple punitive damage awards against · a single 
defendant. 47 
Two alternatives, however, bear brief examination. First, evi-
dence of a defendant's assets can be presented to the jury,48 and 
might lead it to fashion an appropriate award in a single action. 
Where many plaintiffs seek punitive recovery, however, instructions 
concerning a defendant's wealth will not lead to balanc~d awards if 
each jury proceeds without knowing what the others are doing. 
Moreover, knowledge of a defendant's wealth may prejudice some 
juries against the tortfeasor,49 thus compounding the risk of a high 
award. Second, after a verdict finding that defendant is liable for 
punitive damages, a court could instruct the jury as to prior punitive 
recovery awarded for the same offense. This information could be 
used in fixing damages. so If this instruction persuades a jury to re-
duce or eliminate a potential award of punitive damages, it will 
prejudice the interests of affected plaintiffs.s1 On the other hand, the 
jury may use prior punitive awards to conclude that the defendant 
deserves even more punishment,52 thus aggravating the risk of de-
fendant's bankruptcy. 
Because punitive damages create a limited fund, the claims of the 
plaintiffs should be brought before a single court for unitary adjudi-
cation. Aside from bankruptcy proceedings and interpleader, a class 
action provides the only means to achieve this result. Moreover, a 
class action is superior to either of these two alternatives. A bank-
ruptcy court should not hear collateral punitive claims against a 
debtors3 and will in any event be constrained to use Rule 23 to join 
tive damages. "The acceptance of punitive damages in most other jurisdictions appears to be 
too popular and well-established to be discarded. Rationales such as compensation, punish-
ment and deterrence, revenge, and the promotion of justice perpetuate its existence in remedial 
law." K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 2.1, at 24; accord W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 2, at 11. 
Punitive damages have become a settled feature of American tort law. As long as courts 
continue to award them, both plaintiffs and defendants deserve protection against the arbitrary 
or unfair extraction and allocation of the punitive damages windfall. As this Note argues, the 
best vehicle for implementing that protection is the class action. 
47. See note 32 supra. 
48. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981); Weisenberg v. Molina, 
58 Cal. App. 3d 478, 490; 129 Cal. Rptr. 813, 820 (1976); D. DOBBS, supra note 16, § 3.9, at 
218-19. 
. 49. Morris, supra note 19, at 1191. 
50. JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898 & n.39; State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 
61, 618 P.2d 1263, 1273-74 (1980); K. REDDEN, supra note 11, at § 4.8; REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 908 co=ent 3 (1979); Morris, supra note 19, at 1195. 
51. JJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 898; see notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text. 
52. Morris, supra note 19, at 1195 n.40; Note, supra note 11, at 1806-07. 
53. First, the bankruptcy court probably lacks power to hear such claims. See Northern 
Pipe Line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982); Winter, Bankmptcies 
Create Asbestos Case Turmoil, 68 A.B.AJ. 1361 (1982); cf. N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, 
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plaintiffs affected by a defendant's bankruptcy.54 More important, 
the fact that a defendant has been driven to bankruptcy by punitive 
claims means that the defendants, plaintiffs, and society have al-
ready been injured.55 lnterpleader56 is inadequate because the de-
fendant's lack of control over a stake in controversy would preclude 
joinder of punitive damages claimants.57 
col. l (late ed.) (representatives of Johns-Manville, filing under Chapter 11, argue that bank-
ruptcy court is the most appropriate place to apportion damages where creditors' claims exceed 
assets); note 82 infra. 
Second, even if Congress alters the bankruptcy courts to allow them to hear collateral 
claims, "(t]he policies underlying the doctrines of pendent jurisdiction and the right to trial by 
jury suggest that the bankruptcy court should leave the estimation of individual claims to state 
courts and other federal courts." Note, supra note 39, at 1123; see also id. at 1136-41. 
54. See l l U.S.C. app. at 1349 (1976); Note, supra note 39, at 1133-34 (bankruptcy rules 
incorporate FED. R. C1v. P. 23). Thus, a bankruptcy court wishing to certify a class action on 
claims for punitive damages should use the approach discussed in Part II infra. 
55. See notes 3l-40supra and accompanying text. Johns-Manville's decision to file under 
Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (Supp. V. 1981), see note 82 infra, illustrates the problems 
that arise when a defendant is driven into bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 filing automatically 
stayed all litigation against Manville. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. III 1979); see Winter, supra 
note 53, at 1361. Thus, Manville's move may have amounted to "an effort to evade thousands 
oflaw suits filed by severely ill workers .... " Miller, Don't Let Industry Shirk Its Duty, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (late ed.); see Note, supra note 39, at 1122 ("Manville thus 
appears to be attempting to use the bankruptcy power largely as a tool to limit the aggregate 
size of its current and future liabilities." (footnote omitted)); N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1982, at D4, 
col. l. The Chapter 11 filings may also stay proceedings against all defendants in actions in 
which Manville is a codefendant. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 11 Bankr. 294 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1981) (plaintiff cannot dismiss reorganization debtor and proceed only against co-
defendants); Winter, supra note 53, at 1361. Even if§ 362(a) stays proceedings only against 
the debtor in bankruptcy, other defendants will likely file under Chapter 11 to escape or at 
least postpone liability. Winter, supra note 53, at 1361; see note 82 infra. In short, Manville's 
move injured the interests of affected plaintiffs. 
In addition to claimants, "[t]he stockholders are going to take a pasting ... and so are 
some of the unsecured creditors .... Every day this stays in bankruptcy court, the likelihood 
of their getting paid all they are owed diminishes." N.Y. Times, Sept. l, 1982, at D12, col. 5 
(late ed.) (quoting Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., of Yale Law School). In fact, the value of 
Manville's stock dropped from around seven or eight dollars a share before the filing to $4. 75 a 
share by September l. See id., Sept. l, 1982, at DI, col. l. 
The object is to prevent the defendant from going into bankruptcy in order to avoid these 
consequences. A class action for punitive damages achieves this result. 
56. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976) (statutory interpleader); FED. R. C1v. P. 22 (rule 
interpleader). 
57. Both statutory and rule interpleader are used to join adverse claimants when the stake-
holder controls the fund in controversy. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 1702, 1704, (1972). The party defending against punitive damages claims can-
not interplead the plantiffs before a judgment is rendered because the amount of liability is 
indeterminate: The defendant does not control the fund simply because it does not yet exist. 
The defendant could argue that the first punitive judgment against it is the extent to which it 
ought to be punished, and then interplead remaining plaintiffs using the first judgment as a 
stake. The problem again is that the defendant does not control the fund after it is paid over to 
the plaintiff. Moreover, this attetnpt would probably fail because it would not satisfy the ad-
verse claimant requirement inherent in interpleader. See id. at § 1705. The claims of subse-
quent plaintiffs are adverse to defendant's assets, but not to the claim of a plaintiff who has 
already received a punitive judgment. q. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 896 n.31 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981) (refusing to characterize plaintiffs' action against defendant as an "interpleader 
situation" but observing that ''the amount of punitive damages recoverable against Robins is, 
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In sum, because multiple punitive damages actions will create a 
limited fund, the court must manage the action to produce an equita-
ble result. A Rule 2358 class action provides the best means to allow 
society to punish the defendant effectively, to preserve the interests 
of plaintiffs, and to protect socially valuable defendants. 
II. RULE 23(b)(l)(B) CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. Appropriateness of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) in the Context of the 
Limited .Fund 
Rule 23(b)(l)(B)59 permits a court to certify a class action when 
"adjudications with respect to individual members of the class . . . 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interest of the other 
members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests."60 If state law limits a 
fund, or if punitive claims absorb a defendant's assets, the interests 
of late-suing plaintiffs will as a practical matter be disposed of.61 
The plaintiffs' interests in seeking punitive damages thus bring this 
limited fund within the ambit of Rule 23(b)(l)(B). 
A (b)(l)(B) class action provides the best means to manage a lim-
ited fund created by multiple punitive damage claims. The Advisory 
Committee Comments state that 
[i]n various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of 
the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect 
on the interests of other members who should therefore be represented 
in the law suit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numer-
ous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims . . . . 62 
Moreover, while some courts have indicated that Rule 23(b)(l)(B) is 
ordinarily inappropriate in an action for money damages, 63 an "indi-
at least in theory, a sum certain for interpleader purposes."), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). 
58. FED. R. C1v. P. 23. 
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l)(B). 
60. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l) provides that: 
An action may be maintained as class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are 
satisfied, and in addition: 
(l) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the 
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the 
class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; ..• 
61. See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text. 
62. Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966) (emphasis added). 
63. E.g., Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 
(1983); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976); McDonnell 
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vidual action [that] inescapably will alter the substance of the rights 
of others having similar claims ... falls within Rule 23(b)(l)(B)."64 
For example, when numerous plaintiffs confront a fund limited by 
statute, the court may certify a damages claim under Rule 
23(b)(l)(B).65 Other cases indicate that certification should also fol-
low when the law or the threat of bankruptcy limits the fund avail-
able for punitive recovery.66 Thus, if punitive claims create a limited 
fund, a court should use a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action to protect the 
interests of affected plaintiffs.67 
The other subdivisions of Rule 23(b) are not appropriate in a 
class action for punitive damages. Rule 23(b)(2), which renders a 
class action maintainable if the party opposing the class has acted so 
Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
911 (1976); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968); Ziegler v. Gibralter 
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 43 F.R.D. 169 (D.S.D. 1967). 
64. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467 (9th Cir. 1973); see also 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (quoting La Mar). 
65. See Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558,561 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd. 
mem., 501 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975), where plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. The limited fund derived from 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976), which limits liability for owners 
of seagoing vessels. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976) (limiting liability for a nuclear accident). 
66. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 
1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 
1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); see also 
In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 
n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class action). 
67. Several courts and commentators have suggested that the best way to manage punitive 
damages is to make a single award covering all plaintiffs. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 n.11 (2d Cir. 1967) (if cases could be brought before a single court, 
jury might be able to make appropriate award for distribution among all successful plaintiffs); 
Proud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658-59, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913 (1982) (if defendants 
fear backbreaking punitive damage awards, they should request that the trial court certify a 
class action for punitive damages); Bartolo v. Boardwalk Regency Hotel Casino, 185 N.J. 
Super. 540,546 n.l, 449 A.2d 1343, 1346 n.l (1982) (solution endorsed by courts and commen-
tators "is to require all punitive damage claims based upon the same wrongful conduct to be 
pursued together in a single class action"); State ex rel Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61, 618 
P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980) (class actions provide for unitary consideration of punitive damages); 
K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.16, at 134 ("[T]here should only be one award of punitive 
damages for the entire class of victims."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 908 comment 
e (1979) ("In a class action involving all claims, full assessment of the punitive damages can be 
made."); Morris, supra note 19, at 1195 ("forced joinder" might be appropriate where multiple 
plaintiffs sue a defendant). See generally Putz & Astiz, supra note 12. 
Similarly, Rule 23 does not foreclose "the application of class action concepts to cases , • , 
in which repetitive litigation based on a single set of facts threatens to cause irreparable harm 
both to the defendant and more importantly to thousands of plaintiffs left with a legal right but 
potentially no adequate remedy." In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying "Dalkon 
Shield" class action). Rule 23(b)(l)(B) will equitably distribute the limited fund to class mem-
bers whose interests would otherwise be impaired or disposed of by damage awards that de-
plete the fund. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.·817 
(1983). 
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as to justify "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory re-
lief to the class as a whole," does not apply to actions for money 
damages.68 Similarly, Rule 23(b)(l)(A) ordinarily does not apply to 
damage suits because judgments produced by such actions do not 
"establish incompatible standards of conduct for a party opposing 
the class."69 
68. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(2); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States Dist. Ct., 523 
F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1975); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 
790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975); 
Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). This result also follows if the ac-
tion seeks a declaratory judgment which does not correspond to final injunctive relief. "De-
claratory relief'corresponds' to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it affords injunctive 
relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief. Subdivision (b )(2) does not extend to cases 
in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages." 
Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. at 102. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United 
States Dist. Ct., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 91 I (1976), the court 
rejected the notion that a mass accident class action seeking declaratory relief could be certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2). The court stated that "subdivision (b)(2) by its own terms does not 
apply to actions only for damages .... the declaratory relief sought by plaintiffs adds noth-
ing to their claim for damages." 523 F.2d at 1087 (citations omitted). Because punitive dam-
age awards fall within this prohibition, a class seeking punitive damages should not be 
certified under subdivision (b )(2). 
Contra In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1972), where the court certified a 
(b )(2) mass-accident class seeking declaratory relief on the question of liability without dis-
cussing the reasoning that supported certification under this subdivision. The court in Causey 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975), approved the result reached in 
Gabel but rejected class certification under subdivision (b)(2). 66 F.R.D. at 397. In addition, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected Gabel in McDonnell Douglas. 523 F.2d 
at 1087. The Gabel court erred because final relief was not injunctive but was related predomi-
nately to money damages; declaratory relief was merely an interim measure, not a final judg-
ment. Note, Mass Accident Litigation, 40 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 320, 327 (1974). 
69. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(l)(A). A defendant.facing multiple damage suits can avoid being 
placed in a position of conflict simply by compensating some plaintiffs but not others. Causey 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 398 (E.D. Va. 1975); see, e.g., Green v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1976); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United 
States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); La 
Marv. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973); In re "Agent Orange" 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 
382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); Kekich v. Travelers Indem. Co., 64 F.R.D. 660, 677 (W.D. Pa. 1974); 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 62 F.R.D. 124, 132 (E.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 561 F.2d 434 (1977), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Landau v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 367 F. Supp. 992, 997 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
However, in regard to a limited fund, one could argue that a defendant would be forced to 
act inconsistently if it were able to pay only some of the judgments rendered against it. See 
Klenk & Kelly, Rule 23 (1966) Purpose & Prerequisites, in CLASS ACTIONS [2.42] at 2-47 (Illi-
nois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1974); cf. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 
424 (W.D. Mo.) (certifying a (b)(l)(A) class on the issue of liability for compensatory and 
punitive damages), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 
342 (1982); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 46 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certifying (b)(l)(A) class 
action against limited fund because "adjudications awarding damages to individual members 
of the class ... might impose inconsistent standards of conduct upon defendants .... "); Her-
nandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 561 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd mem., 507 F.2d 
1278 (5th Cir. 1975) ("a (b)(l)(A) class action is viable when a co=on fund exists that may be 
evaporated by an award to some of the prospective claimants"); Berman v. Narragansett Rac-
ing Assn., 48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969) ("One suit might well order a payment of damages 
and another might well forbid it."); 1 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS§ 1135a (1977) ((b)(l)(A) 
classes have been certified in actions for money damages). 
But if a limited fund exists, the action can be certified under subdivision (b)(l)(B). See 
1800 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 81:1787 
Finally, a Rule 23(b)(3) "opt-out" class action would be inade-
quate because the limited fund created by multiple actions for puni-
tive damages can be protected effectively only if all claimants are 
joined in a single action.70 In fact, the most important consequence 
of (b)(l)(B) certification is that class members cannot opt out; the 
court's judgment thus binds all class members.71 This feature pre-
vents plaintiffs from pursuing independent litigation72 that would as 
a practical matter dispose of the interests of later plaintiffs. 73 Be-
cause (b)(l)(B) protects a limited fund by binding all class members, 
it is the most appropriate subdivision under which to certify a class 
action for punitive damages. 
B. Finding the Limited Fund 
Before a court can certify a Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action for pu-
nitive damages, it must determine that a limited fund actually exists. 
In cases where the presence of a limited fund is uncertain, courts will 
not order a (b)(l)(B) class action.74 However, even those courts that 
have refused to certify an action in such circumstances have held 
notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text. Moreover if the class action is maintainable under 
23(b)(l) at all, "nothing turns on which clause is controlling." Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 
F.R.D. at424;accord 1 H. NEWBERG,supra, at§ 1130. Thus, although a court could conceiva-
bly certify a class action seeking a limited fund under subdivision (b)(l)(A), the more accurate 
- and safer - approach would be to certify under subdivision (b)(l)(B). 
70. The limited fund concept underlying (b)(l)(B) certification demands that a judgment 
be binding on all class members. Because plaintiffs can opt out of a (b)(3) class action, see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), those who do not wish to participate in the action could exhaust a 
limited fund by winning the one or few punitive judgments that state law allows against a 
single defendant, or by obtaining large judgments that threaten to exhaust a defendant's assets. 
See K. REDDEN, supra note 11, § 4.8(0), § 4.16. Moreover, if a court finds that (b)(l)(B) 
certification is warranted, it should certify the class under subdivision (b)(l)(B) rather than 
(b)(3). See Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 1 H. NBWBBRO, 
supra note 69, at § 1146. 
This is not to say that (b)(3) certification should never be used where plaintiffs face a lim-
ited fund. If a court concludes that other factors, such as the Anti-Injunction Act, see Part III 
infra, preclude (b)(l)(B) certification, then a rule 23(b)(3) class action can be used as a next-
best option. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (1982) (remand); Payton v. Abbott 
Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 392 (D. Mass. 1979). See generally Putz & Astiz, supra note 12 (urging 
that plaintiffs who opt out of a class action for punitive damages be precluded from bringing 
individual punitive claims). However, where a limited fund appears, (b)(l)(B) certification is 
always preferable to maintaining the class under other Rule 23 subdivisions. 
71. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1339 (9th Cir. 1976); Dalkon 
Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 906 & n.75 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds 
sub nom Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 
(1983); Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, (2.7), at 2-14; Note, supra note 35, at 1152-53. 
72. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1978). 
73. "Insofar as class actions which are brought under subsection (b){l) of Rule 23 are 
concerned, the binding effect of a judgment on the class is necessary . . . to protect class mem-
bers from adjudications which could dispose of their interests." Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, 
(2.7), at 2-14. 
74. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847,851 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 
(1983); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 789-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); 
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979). 
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open the prospect that Rule 23(b)(l)(B) could be used if the court 
were certain that the fund was limited.75 
Courts have not defined the legal showing required to establish 
the presence of a limited fund. At most, the cases indicate when a 
court may not certify a (b)(l)(B) class.76 But if the law of the forum 
clearly indicates that only one punitive damage award may be recov-
ered against a defendant, then the fund is clearly limited and should 
be subject to a (b)(l)(B) class action.77 
Further, if a court considers certifying a (b)(l)(B) class action 
against the limited fund created when plaintiffs' claims exceed a de-
75. Problems in proving the existence of a limited fund usually arise where plaintiffs 
claims allegedly exceed defendant's assets. In In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. 
Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) the court refused to certify a {b)(l)(B) class because the plaintiffs 
had offered no evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants. 506 F. Supp. at 789-90. 
The district court in Da/kon Shield, distinguished Agent Orange on that basis, holding in con-
trast that the Dalkon Shield claims posed a real threat of bankruptcy. 526 F. Supp. at 897. 
Payton v. Abbott Labs, on the other hand, rejected plaintiffs' attempt to establish a group 
insurance fund, paid for by defendants, as one remedy in a DES case. "The plaintiffs do not 
... offer evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants, and I do not believe that, without 
more, numerous plaintiffs and a large ad damnum clause should guarantee (b)(l)(B) certifica-
tion." 83 F.R.D. at 389. Even so, no court has categorically ruled out a (b)(l)(B) class action 
where plaintiffs' claims exceed defendant's assets. 
Other cases indicate that (b)(l)(B) certification may be appropriate where plaintiffs' claims 
threaten to bankrupt a defendant. In Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335 (9th 
Cir. 1976), the court noted that (b)(l)(B) certification would be called for "where the claims of 
all plaintiffs exceeded the assets of the defendant and hence to allow any group of individuals 
to be fully compensated would impair the rights of those in court." 541 F.2d at 1340 n.9; cf. 
Klenk & Kelly,supra note 69, at [2.45]. The court in Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. 
Ky. 1977), relied in part on the language in Green in certifying a (b)(l)(B) class action where 
claims arising from a nightclub fire exceeded the defendant's assets. 77 F.R.D. at 46. 
However, the Ninth Circuit limited the Green footnote in Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. because 
Green involved a !Ob-5 securities action and not "mass personal injury claims." 693 F.2d at 
851. This distinction is not convincing because (b)(l)(B) certification turns on the presence of 
a limited fund, not on the nature of the action. In addition, the Ninth Circuit left open the 
possibility that adequate proof of threatened insolvency might warrant a class action: 
The detrimental effect of earlier claims upon later claims co=ends itself to this court as 
worthy of future judicial and legislative consideration. As plaintiffs in this case correctly 
argue, though, not every plaintiff will prevail and not every plaintiff will receive a jury 
award in the amount requested. Thus on the present state of the record, the detrimental 
effect of separate punitive damages awards is not clearly inescapable. 
693 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added). The few courts that have spoken to the issue thus do not 
rule out (b)(l)(B) certification where plaintiffs' claims exceed a defendant's assets. What they 
do require is evidence that such claims threaten to bankrupt the defendant. 
16. See note 75 supra. 
77. In Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), the district court read the Missouri 
appellate court's decision in Monsanto Co. v. Parker, No. 43829 (Mo. Ct. App., argued Dec. 9, 
1981), dismissed as moot, 634 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), as holding that only one puni-
tive damage judgment would be allowed against a given defendant, and used this conclusion 
as a partial justification for (b)(l)(B) certification. 93 F.R.D. at 424-25. The Eighth Circuit did 
not reach the merits of the holding in vacating the lower court order, 680 F.2d at 1177 n.4, so 
the notion that a court can certify a (b)(l)(B) class action to manage a fund limited by state law 
retains precedential validity. See 680 F.2d at 1187 (Heaney, J., dissenting); cf. Hernandez v. 
Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qffd mem., 501 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 
1975) (fund limited by statute). 
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fendant's assets, it should rely on evidence showing that the fund is 
actually limited.78 Thus, the court must decide whether punitive 
awards will exceed defendant's assets. Relevant evidence would m-
clude proof of defendant's actual assets, insurance, settlements, and 
continuing exposure.79 
The court should certify a (b)(l)(B) class action only if the evi-
dence indicates that the plaintiffs' punitive claims threaten to bank-
rupt the defendant. The issue, therefore, turns on the standard of 
certainty by which the court must test the proof. The trial court in 
Dalkon Shield opined that "[n]either the rule nor the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes requires proof that claims 'will,' as a certainty, exhaust 
the fund. Certification is appropriate if individual actions 'may' af-
fect the claims of parties not before the court."80 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected this pronouncement, declaring instead that the record must 
establish "that separate punitive awards inescapably will affect later 
awards."81 Although the standard imposed by the Court of Appeals 
is more rigorous than that adopted by the trial court, it does not pose 
an insurmountable barrier to (b)(l)(B) certification. Inasmuch as 
multiple claims have caused defendants to file in bankruptcy in the 
past,82 it should be possible to document such a threat where it actu-
78. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub 
_nom Abed v. A.H. Robins, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); cj 
note 79 i'!fra; see also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MA• 
JOR ISSUES AFFECTING COMPLEX LITIGATION 25 (1981) (trial court may authorize pre-certifi-
cation discovery on issues relating to certification). Although discovery should be used to 
determine whether a limited fund exists, it must not amount to an inquiry into the merits of the 
action. 526 F. Supp. at 919; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
79. The Ninth Circuit vacated the lower court's order certifying a class action for punitive 
damages in part because the judge erred by ordering class certification without sufficient proof 
of, or even inquiry into, the defendant's actual assets, insurance, settlement experience, and 
continuing exposure. Although the district court conceded that discovery should be used to 
identify a limited fund, see note 78 supra, it certified the class action solely on the basis of the 
defendant's attorney's affidavit showing the claims against the defendant and its assets. 693 
F.2d at 852. The court did not reopen discovery to permit plaintiffs to challenge the affidavits, 
526 F. Supp. at 911-19;see 693 F.2d at 852. Moreover, the district court did not allow out-of• 
state plaintiffs to participate in punitive damage class briefings. 693 F.2d at 852. Information 
pertaining to a defendant's assets and the likelihood of insolvency can be obtained by in cam-
era revelation. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other 
grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); rf. Note, supra note 35, at 
1158 ("Some form of evidentiary hearing will be necessary to determine the amount of assets 
available for recovery, the potential number of awards, and the magnitude of the amount to be 
recovered, but such a hearing should be quite limited."). 
80. 526 F. Supp. at 891;seealso Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1187 n.9 (Heaney, 
J., dissenting) (Rule 23(b)(l)(B) does not require proof that claims will exhaust a defendant's 
capacity to pay); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1977). 
81. 693 F.2d at 851. 
82. For example, Johns-Manville faced 16,500 asbestos-related claims, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
5, 1982, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (late ed.), and anticipated that this number would rise to 32,000 as 
latent injuries materialized. Id., Aug. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 6. With potential liability estimated 
at two billion dollars, Manville feared that the company would be unable to satisfy judgments 
against it. Id As a result, Manville filed in bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1174 (Supp. III 1979),joining UNR Industries and several smaller asbestos insulation makers 
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ally exists. 83 
Moreover, the trial court's standard is arguably more appropriate 
than that used by the Court of Appeals for two reasons. First, the 
hazards posed to plaintiffs, defendants, and society by bankruptcy84 
suggest that a court should certify a (b)(l)(B) class action as a pre-
cautionary measure even where bankruptcy is not absolutely certain. 
Second, the Advisory Committee's Comments state that (b)(l)(B) 
certification is appropriate where "an adjudication as to one or.more 
members of the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse 
practical effect on the interests of other members . . . ."85 Rule 23 
itself states that a (b)(l) class action is appropriate if separate adjudi-
cations merely "risk" destroying or impairing the interests of non-
parties. 86 Thus, the court would be justified in certifying a (b)(l)(B) 
class action if multiple suits presented a "significant likelihood" that 
individual claims would affect the interests of parties not before the 
court.87 
C. Conducting the Class Action 
Once the court concludes that the fund available for punitive re-
covery is limited, it must then decide whether the other prerequisites 
of class action are present. The number of plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages must render joinder impractical, the action must pose ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, the punitive claims of the 
class representatives must be typical of the entire class, and the rep-
resentative parties must protect the interests of the class.88 
The most important prerequisite in a class action for punitive 
damages is commonality. Because a mass accident affects plaintiffs 
in several jurisdictions, a court sitting in diversity may have difficulty 
who had already been sent into bankruptcy. See Winter, supra note 53, at 1361; N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 18, 1982, at 35, col. 3. 
83. See Note, supra note 39, at 1121-22 ("Although Manville and UNR Industries are the 
first such apparently healthy corporations to file Chapter 11 petitions in the face of massive 
tort claims, manufacturers in a variety of industries that face similar liability could follow 
suit." (footnote omitted)). 
84. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text. 
85. Advisory Committee Comments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966) (emphasis added). 
86. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(l); see Note, supra note 35, at I 158. 
87. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1187 n.9 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
88. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) provides: 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representive parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the inter-
ests of the class. 
All four prerequisites must be met. See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798 
(5th Cir. 1982). The burden of establishing that a class meets these prerequisites lies with the 
party seeking certification. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.13], at 2-17. 
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isolating a punitive law common to all class members.89 This prob-
lem is not insurmountable for three reasons. First, a punitive damage 
class action poses common questions of fact going to the defendant's 
culpability.90 Because Rule 23(a) requires only that the action pres-
ent "questions oflaw or fact common to the class,"91 the court could 
certify those issues relying on facts going to defendant's punitive lia-
bility and then apply the determination reached by the trier of fact to 
the measure of damages.92 Second, "the court could determine a 
consensus of shared values or policies in formulating a 'compromise' 
standard" of punitive recovery that would account for the interests 
of all affected states.93 Finally, the court must exclude from the class 
those claimants who cannot recover punitive damages under appli-
cable state law.94 
89. If the action is brought under a federal statute rather than diversity jurisdiction, federal 
statutory or court-made law will control, thus providing a common question of law. D. 
DOBBS, supra note 16, § 1.5, at 12. But if the suit is a diversity action, the federal court must 
apply the choice of law provisions of the state in which it sits. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. 
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). If the wrong giving rise to multiple claims occurs in a single jurisdic-
tion, and that jurisdiction uses the traditional lex loci delecli rule to determine whose law will 
control, the court will apply the punitive damage standard of the state in which it sits, see note 
41 supra, and no problem of commonality will arise. Comment, The Use of Class A clions for 
Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Lov. L. REv. 383, 391 (1977). If, on the other hand, the wrong 
affects persons in more than one jurisdiction, the law of the forum might require the court 
sitting in diversity to apply different punitive damage laws to different members. For example, 
half of the states deny punitive damages in cases where the plaintiff dies; in addition, standards 
for recovery range from simple negligence to malice, fraud, and oppressive conduct. K. RED-
DEN, supra note 11, § 4.11, at 127. The Ninth Circuit adduced the differences in punitive 
damages standards as one reason for denying certification in lJalkon Shield. 693 F.2d at 850. 
However, the court went on to note that "[i]f commonality were the only problem in this case, 
it might be possible to sustain some kind of a punitive damage class." 693 F.2d at 850. 
90. Abed v. A.H. Robins, 693 F.2d at 850 (the court conceded that defendant's knowledge 
of product safety, when defendant obtained such knowledge, what information defendant 
withheld from public, and what defendant stated in advertising to doctors "may all be com-
mon questions."); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. 
Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class) (defendant's conduct 
in manufacturing and marketing of Dalkon Shield presented common questions of law and 
fact with respect to punitive liability); cf. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir. 
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (facts relevant to liability will not differ meaningfully from one 
defendant to another), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 628 
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (right of each member of class to recover damages turns on a common set of 
facts). 
91. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). 
92. The court could take different laws into account when an individual from an affected 
state makes his or her claim on the class fund. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 917. Alterna-
tively, special verdicts or general verdicts with interrogatories could be used to apply different 
punitive laws to various individuals or groups of individuals in a single trial. See FED. R. C1v. 
P. 49(a), 49(b); Comment, supra note 89, at 393. 
93. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 917. Although the precise measure of damages may 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, "[a]ll states in which punitive damages are allowed have 
a shared interest in seeing that the alleged misconduct is punished." 526 F. Supp. at 909. 
94. lJalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 916 n.158. This result follows because plaintiffs without 
punitive claims pose no threat to the limited fund. However, the court should consider the 
viability of individual claims under applicable state law in assessing the risk that punitive 
awards will exhaust defendant's assets. See notes 78-87 supra and accompanying text. 
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The numerosity requirement is usually satisfied when punitive 
claims are so numerous that they exceed a defendant's assets.95 
Where the law limits the number of possible punitive recoveries, the 
95. The numerosity requirement is satisfied where joinder is impracticable. See, e.g., Fed-
eral Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,421 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 
(8th Cir. 1982) (class arising from accident where several hundred people had been killed or 
injured held sufficiently numerous), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of 
Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order 
conditionally certifying class action) (1600 claims pending nationwide in state and federal 
courts sufficiently numerous); Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (con-
cluding that a class consisting of the legal representatives of over 200 people killed or injured 
in a fire satisfied the numerosity prerequisite). Joinder need only be impracticable, not impos-
sible. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Payton 
v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 346 (1976). A showing of "strong litigational inconvenience" satis-
fies the numerosity requirement. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 421 (W.D. Mo.) va-
cated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). 
Because a tort provides the most co=on reason to seek punitive damages, K. REDDEN, 
supra note 11, at § 2.6, a mass tort is the paradigm situation in which the numerosity require-
ment will be satisfied. For example, both Federal Skywalk Cases and Dalkon Shield involved 
mass torts. See notes l-2supra. This observation is important because the Advisory Co=it-
tee Co=ents indicate that class certification may not be appropriate in a "mass accident" 
situation: 
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate 
for a class action because of the likelihood that significiant questions, not only of damages 
but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in 
different ways. In these circumstances an action would degenerate in practice into multi-
ple law suits separately tried. 
Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 
This admonition does not bar (b)(l)(B) certification ofa class action for punitive damages 
for four reasons. First, the co=ent states only that a class action will not "ordinarily" be 
appropriate for a mass accident; it does not indicate that certification would never be called 
for. Because punitive damages claims go to the defendant's conduct relative to a class of plain-
tiffs, (b)(l)(B) certification poses no risk of degenerating into multiple law suits. 
Second, the Committee expressed its concern "with particular reference to subdivision 
(b)(3) of the Rule." Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 396-97 (E.D. Va. 
1975). In a (b)(3) situation, "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as in" a (b)(l) or 
(b)(2) class action. Advisory Committee Co=ents, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03. A (b)(3) class ac-
tion allows "opt out" and requires notice, while actions maintained under (b)(l) and (b)(2) do 
not. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(2). Because a subdivision (b)(3) class action differs materially 
from its subdivision (b)(l) or (b)(2) counterpart, the Advisory Committee's opposition to class 
certification for mass accidents may apply only to actions arising under subdivision (b)(3). 
Third, because Rule 23 itself does not prohibit a class action in a mass tort, it arguably 
permits certification of a (b)(l) mass accident class action. In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 627 
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (If Rule 23 was not intended to cover mass tort actions, "it would have been 
simple enough to have said so in the text of the rule."); accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 
F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.342 (1982). 
Finally, courts indicate that class certification can be used when the class action is limited 
to a single issue, such as liability. See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 389-91 (D. Mass. 
1979); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 560 (S.D. Fla. 1973), qjfd mem., 
507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 
47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); accord Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1189 (8th Cir. 
1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (concerns expressed in Advisory Committee Co=ents simply 
do not apply when facts relevant to punitive liability do not differ meaningfully from one 
claimant to another), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). Even cases that have refused class 
certification in a mass disaster admit that a court can use the device where it can limit class 
issues. E.g., Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392,397 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hobbs v. 
Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Thus, even if the punitive damages arise 
from a mass tort, the court can still use (b )(1 )(B) class certification to protect a limited fund. 
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number of plaintiffs may satisfy the numerosity prerequisite;96 how-
ever, the claims of few plaintiffs against such a fund would be better 
managed by joinder.97 
The typicality98 and adequacy of representation99 prerequisites 
pose no problems unique to class actions for punitive damages. 100 In 
any event, where doubt remains as to whether the prerequisites for a 
punitive damage class are present, the court should resolve that 
doubt in favor of certification.101 
Upon concluding that a limited fund exists and that the prerequi-
sites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, the court should exercise its discre-
tion to certify as soon as possible a class action consisting of all 
persons who claim punitive damages against a particular defen-
dant.102 The court should certify the class even if no party to the 
96. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co,, 693 
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). 
97. In this sense, joinder would be practicable because only a few plaintiffs would be seek-
ing a punitive award. See FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a)(2) (person subject to service of process who 
will not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction shall be joined if "he claims an interest 
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his 
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest 
.... "); FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (permissive joinder). 
98. The claims will be typical if they arise from the same factual setting. Da/kon Shield, 
526 F. Supp. at 900. The typicality requirement does not mandate total identity of interests 
among class members. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D. Mass. 1979). 
99. "Adequacy of representation depends on the qualifications and interests of counsel for 
the class representatives, the absence of antagonism or conflicting interests, and a showing of 
interests between.class representatives and absentees." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab, Li-
tig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). In Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. 
Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), the 
court held that representation was adequate where the class representatives were able to act as 
fiduciaries in protecting class interests and possessed the resources needed to prosecute certi-
fied claims. The representatives had no conflicts of interests with other class members, were 
not motivated by factors unrelated to the case itself, and had a substantial stake in the outcome 
of the controversy. In addition, lead counsel was experienced in complex litigation and was 
therefore qualified to conduct the action. 93 F.R.D. at 422. As to the adequacy of representa-
tives' counsel, courts have considered counsel's pleadings and briefs, compliance with the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, and litigation experience. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.35], 
at 2-41; see Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (representation adequate 
where lead counsel was experienced in tort class action litigation and in the substantive law of 
Kentucky). 
100. Two additional requirements often inferred from Rule 23 - that the class must be 
identifiable and that the class representatives must be members of the class - also present no 
difficulty peculiar to a (b)(l)(B) action for punitive damages. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
101. Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, [2.13], at 2-17. 
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(l) provides that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commence-
ment of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to 
be so maintained." The court can always alter the order if facts develop that lead the court to 
revise its position. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 918-19 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). 
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action has so moved, 103 and need only exercise personal jurisdiction 
over named plaintiffs. 104 Although class members may also have 
compensatory claims against the defendant, the court can certify the 
punitive damage issue for separate class action treatment. 105 
Named plaintiffs representing the punitive damage class can then 
present to the jury evidence relevant to punitive damage issues, such 
as the defendant's wealth, the nature and number of injuries alleg-
edly caused by the defendant's wrongful act, and the extent to which 
the defendant's conduct was malicious. 106 If the jury finds the de-
fendant liable for punitive damages, the court will ask it to award a 
sum to punish the defendant once for all potential claimants.107 The 
sum awarded can then be allocated according to an equitable 
formula approved by the court108 among class members who file 
103. Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
870 (1976); Huffv. N.D. Cass Co., 485 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc);Federal Skywalk 
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415,423 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 894-95; Robinson v. First Natl. 
City Bank, 482 F. Supp. 92, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stevenson v. Smith, 73 F.R.D. 79, 81 (D. 
Del. 1976). Contra Wilson v. Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1976) (court cannot certify 
a class actionsua sponte). Zarhadnick was rejected in.Dalkon Shield. 526 F. Supp. at 895 n.18. 
104 . .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 905-07 & 905 n.71 ("adequate representation, and not 
presence, is the foundation of due process in the class suit"); see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
40-41 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356,364 (1921); Dosier v. Miami 
Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981); Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 
248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962). Federal courts can also assume jurisdiction over a nationwide class 
even when many plaintiffs are not within the jurisdiction of the district court. See, e.g., United 
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701-03 (1979). 
105. FED. R. C1v. P. 23 (4)(c)(A) provides that "an action may be brought or maintained as 
a class action with respect to particular issues .... " See, e.g., American Trading and Prod. 
Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Advisory Committee Com-
ments, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966). · 
106. See .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 920 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 
(1983). 
107. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920. 
108. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class 
action). Claimants seeking their share of the recovery fund would be required to present' 
evidence demonstrating that they are members of the punitive class. See Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 
77 F.R.D. 43, 47 (E.D. Ky. 1977); American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, 
Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Damages could be apportioned by a master appointed 
pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 53. Coburn, 17 F.R.D. at 47. The formula for apportionment 
could be a straight pro rata share based on the total number of claimants, or a pro rata share 
based on the amount of compensatory damages recovered by a claimant relative to those se-
cured by others . .Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920 n.183. The second formulation is more 
appropriate because allocation in proportion to actual recovery accords with the rule that pu-
nitive damages are generally not recoverable unless the plaintiff can show actual loss. See D. 
DOBBS,supra note 16, § 3.9, at 208. A plaintiff would not be a member of the punitive damage 
class unless he or she had obtained a compensatory recovery against the defendant. Thus, the 
determination of punitive liability would be "followed by separate proof of the amount of each 
valid claim and proportionate distribution of the funds." Advisory Committee Comments, 39 
F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966). 
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claims "at the end of some reasonable period of time."109 
D. Advantages of a Rule (23)(b)(J)(B) Class Action for Punitive 
.Damages 
A class action for punitive damages secures the plaintifrs inter-
ests in the limited recovery fund, protects the defendant, and pro-
motes judicial economy. It protects plaintiffs' interests in three ways. 
First, a class action tried in a single forum will insure that all plain-
. tiffs have an equal opportunity to assert their punitive claims. 110 
Thus, "[w]hile this coordination will prevent any one plaintiff from 
receiving an individual 'windfall' punitive damage award, it will also 
insure the right of all plaintiffs to some proportionate share of any 
punitive damage recovery." 111 Second, a class action prorates the 
109. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 920. In a footnote to this comment, the court observed 
that "(t]he class necessarily will close at some time. However, in light of the existence of a 
statute of limitations, the number of claimants, which is increasing today, will dwindle to a 
minimal or nonexistent number at some definite point in the future." 526 F. Supp. at 920 
n.184. 
110. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1186 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (order conditionally certifying class); 
Klenk & Kelly, supra note 69, at (2.7]. "The courts should be looking to achieve the funda-
mental fairness which is essential to the maintenance of the judicial system. At a time when 
mass accidents occur with increasing frequency, the courts should strive to find alternatives 
which will allow members of a class to redress a mass wrong as rapidly, as inexpensively, and 
as fairly as possible." Co=ent, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - Litigation of Mass Air 
Crashes, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
111. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded on other 
gr.ounds sub nom Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied. 103 S. 
Ct. 817 (1983). However, one Note argues that allowing awards to go to plaintiffs who sue 
early will encourage efficient litigation by rewarding prompt prosecution of claims. Note, 
supra note 11, at 1811-12. This approach subordinates legitimate claims to the varying dili-
gence of counsel, as well as to other circumstances that might delay an action. See Putz & 
Astiz, supra note 12, at 6 n.27. Moreover, the judicial system would sanction an unseemly race 
to the courthouse by placing a premium on this sort of efficiency. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 
93 F.R.D. 415,424 (W.D. Mo.), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887, 897 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983); Corburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977), 
Some litigants might contend that their individual interest in control of the litigation pre-
cludes class certification. See Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D, 
Va. 1975); Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Note, Mass Accident 
Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1634 (1972); Note, supra note 89, at 397. However, 
because the interest in individual control is an articulated concern only with respect to a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action, a court certifying a class action for punitive damages is not required to 
consider a claimant's interest in individual control. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 
1188-89 (8th Cir. 1982) (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 343 (1982); Note, supra 
note 89, at 400-01. Moreover, "(b]ecause of the possible savings in litigation costs to individual 
class members, it may even be more accurate to assume that many of the class members would 
be willing to sacrifice individual control to gain the benefit of those savings." Note, supra note 
89, at 399; cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(where problems inherent in individual litigation are great, individual class members "have 
almost no interest in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions."), 
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cost of litigation among class members, 112 thus reducing the likeli-
hood that individual plaintifrs attorneys will be outmaneuvered by 
"litigation-wise corporate defendants." 113 Finally, it reduces con-
flicts of interest among plaintiffs' counsel. 114 
A class action for punitive damages also protects the defendant. 
First, and most important, it prevents bankruptcy because a single 
resolution of the punitive damages issue would allow careful consid-
eration of the total award needed to punish a wrongdoer and to deter 
others. 115 Second, the class action device protects the defendant by 
eliminating costly multiple litigation of the punitive damage issue.116 
In addition, the class action for punitive damages promotes judi-
cial economy by avoiding numerous law suits involving the same 
facts, issues, and defendants. Because multiple trials of complex is-
sues severely burden the court system, 117 public policy opposes mul-
112. See, e.g., Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1185 (Heaney, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Dalkon Shield, 526 F.Supp. 887, 918 n.172 (N.D. Cal. 1981), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983). 
113. Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 921; see also O'Toole, Special Aspects of Class Actions, 
in CLASS ACTIONS [11.6] (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1974) (class actions 
eradicate disparity between small plaintiff and large defendant). 
114. If a lawyer represents two clients, one with an early trial date and another with a later 
date, and both face a limited fund, the attorney can zealously pursue the first client's claim 
only to the detriment of the second. This conflict produces an ethical dile=a, see ABA 
Disciplinary Rule No. 5-105, that is resolved by a mandatory class action in which both plain-
tiffs would pursue their claims at the same time. Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. at 425; 
Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 895 n.22. 
115. "Probably the best use to which punitive damages could be put is a co=on fund 
used to help correct the defendant's misdeed to society as a whole, as with 'fluid recoveries' in 
class action suits." Note, supra note 11, at 1799; see Putz & Astiz, supra note 12, at 23 ("[T]he 
problem of arriving at a rational determination of punishment to be imposed on the defendant 
would disappear if all claims could be brought in a single action before one tribunal."); note 67 
supra. 
116. Co=ent, supra note 110, at 451. A defendant should prefer a judgment binding on 
all class members when it wants to avoid the harassment of many suits. Klenk & Kelly, supra 
note 69, at [2.7]. 
117. In Da/kon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983), the 
court had spent nine weeks trying a single claim for Dalkon Shield product liability. "[A]ny 
attempts to try all these cases would bankrupt the district court's calendar and result in a 
tedium of repetition lasting well into the next century." 526 F. Supp. at 893. The court con-
cluded that individual adjudication of the many claims for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages pending in California "would produce an unnecessary and unprecedented burden on 
California's federal judicial system." 526 F. Supp. at 903; ef. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 
1175, 1186 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (class action promotes judicial economy by focus-
ing litigation in the court that must resolve major disputed issues), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 
(1982); Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (remand). 
The class action itself does not impose an unusual burden on the court. An examination of 
Rule 23(b) class actions in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia revealed that 
"class actions have less impact on the court's workload than critics assert and at least in the 
District of Columbia, class actions do not appear to place an overwhelming burden on the 
federal district court." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CLASS ACTION 
STUDY 4 (Co=. Print 1974). The study reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
number of class actions filed in the district court had increased by a factor of seven, rising from 
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tiple suits.us A (b)(l)(B) class promotes this policy by resolving the 
punitive damages issue in a single action. 
III. PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM 
Certifying a mandatory class precludes further proceedings in 
state courts on claims arising from the mass accident that is the sub-
ject of the federal class action. Consequently, mandatory class ac-
tions in diversity cases implicate basic principles of American 
federalism. In a federal system, comity requires the courts of one 
sovereign to act with deference to the courts of another. An injunc-
tion against further proceedings in an action previously initiated in 
the state courts must surmount the obstacles posed by the Anti-In-
junction Actll9 and the nonintervention doctrine of Younger v. 
Harris. 120 
A. The Anti-Injunction Act 
The Anti-Injunction Act provides that a federal court may enjoin 
state court proceedings121 only "expressly as authorized by Congress, 
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectu-
ate its judgments."122 In Federal Skywalk Cases, the Eighth Circuit 
held that this statute prohibited a mandatory class action in a mass 
accident situation.123 The court noted the accepted principle that the 
federal courts must construe the Act strictly against the granting of 
sixteen in the fiscal year following the 1966 Rule 23 Amendments to 125 in 1972. Id. at S. In 
any event, the court should find the class action unmanageable only if the issues it presents are 
too complex. Administrative burdens alone should not defeat certification. Freeman, Require-
ments for Class Actions, in CLASS ACTIONS (3. 15) (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Edu-
cation 1974). 
118. "[T]he avoidance of multiple litigation is often a goal of our procedural system, and 
with good reason. The duplication of effort, time, and expense that results from such proceed-
ings is wasteful." Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L. REV, 717, 
756 1911;see American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); C. WruoHT, HAND• 
BOOK ON THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 12, at 352 (1973); O'Toole, supra note 113, (11.6), at 
11-4. Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 1 requires that the rules "be construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
119. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1976). 
120. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
121. It is now well-settled that the federal court may not circumvent the Act by enjoining 
the parties, rather than the state court itself, or by use of similar subterfuges. See Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs., 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970); Hill v. 
Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). On the injunctive effect of a mandatory class action, see 
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Piambino 
v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1330-31 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980), This approach 
has prevailed despite the inconsistency between the rules governing appealability of traditional 
injunctions and class certification orders. See Note, supra note 35, at 1160. 
122. 28 u.s.c. § 2283 (1976). 
123. See 680 F.2d at 1181-83. 
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an injunction, 124 and declined to apply the "in aid of jurisdiction" 
exception.125 Even allowing for the rigorous application of the stat-
ute, however, the exceptions for legislative authorization and aid of 
jurisdiction appear to justify certifying a mandatory class. 
1. "Except as Expressly Authorized by Congress" 
In Mitchum v. Foster, the Supreme Court defined the criterion for 
determining when Congress has authorized an injunction against 
state court proceedings: ''The test . . . is whether an act of Congress, 
clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal 
court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of 
a state court proceeding."126 The Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
could not be "given its intended scope" without the federal power to 
enjoin state court proceedings, and remanded the case for further 
consideration of the nonintervention doctrine. 127 The Court has 
subsequently distinguished other statutes of great public importance 
by emphasizing the peculiar focus of section 1983 on remedying 
abuses of state authority, noting the absence of congressional intent 
to constrain the states by other legislation.128 
Congressional ratification is a prerequisite to the adoption of a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.129 The Rules have the force of a 
statute, 130 and may therefore bring mandatory class actions within 
the ambit of the express authorization exception to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act. Like section 1983, diversity jurisdiction directly addresses 
defects in American federalism. 131 In cases of direct and substantial 
conflict, the federal rules override the comity principle of Erie RR v. 
124. 680 F.2d at 1181, quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engrs., 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970). 
125. The superficially attractive exception for protecting or effectuating the judgment of the 
federal court does not apply until after the court has entered a judgment. See, e.g., Essex Sys. 
Co. v. Steinberg, 335 F. Supp. 298, 300, qffd. mem., 441 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir. 1971); 17 C. 
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4226 (1978). 
126. 407 U.S. 225, 237-38 (1972). 
127. 407 U.S. 242-43. 
128. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (single state court case 
cannot be enjoined pursuant to the antitrust laws) (plurality opinion); Mayton, Ersatz Federal-
ism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 18 COLUM. L. REv. 330, 355 (1978). 
129. Changes in the rules take effect ninety days after the Chief Justice reports them to the 
Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 
· 130. See, e.g., United States ex rel Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 838 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); Rumsey v. George E. Failing Co., 333 F.2d 960 (10th 
Cir. 1964). 
131. Whatever its contemporary merits, diversity jurisdiction was intended to restrict the 
power of the states to discriminate against nonresidents. See Bank of the United States v. 
Deveauz, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke 
ed. 1961); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3601 (1975); Moore & Weckstein, .Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 43 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1 (1964). 
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Tompkins .132 In the mass-accident context, staying state court pro-
ceedings in favor of a single federal class action does no more than 
protect both plaintiffs and defendants against the improvident insis-
tence on individual punitive damages by courts sympathetic to local 
claimants. 133 Viewed as a remedy for arbitrary and inequitable as-
sessment of punitive damages in diversity cases, the mandatory class 
procedure falls well within the statutory exception defined by Mitch-
um v. Foster. 134 
2. The "Necessary in Aid of Its Jurisdiction" Exception 
Dissenting in Federal Skywalk Cases, Judge Heaney found it 
"self-evident that an injunction to protect the ordinary scope of a 
mandatory class action is 'necessary in aid of' the federal jurisdiction 
over such a class."135 The individual claimants constitute the class; 
if they remain free to opt out of the federal action, the court has 
effectively lost jurisdiction over the class. 136 
This approach appears analogous to the Anti-Injunction Act 
analysis adopted in the context of interpleader under Rule 22. 137 
Rule 22 interpleader protects an individual's stake in a limited fund 
132. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Walker 
v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980): "The Federal Rules should be given their plain 
meaning. If a direct collision with state law arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis 
developed in Hanna v. Plumer applies." 446 U.S. at 750 n.9. The Court viewed the Walker 
case as not presenting a genuine collision between state and federal rules, and therefore ap-
plied the state rule for tolling the statute of limitations. On the applicability of Hanna v. 
Plumer to Rule 23, see 7 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, at § 1758. 
Such a "procedural" characterization of Rule 23 for Erie purposes does not involve serious 
tension with the test in Mitchum. Deeming a mandatory class procedure a remedy for the 
arbitrary and inequitable assessment of punitive damages, a remedy protected in diversity 
cases by the federal rules, is consistent with both the formal criterion and underlying analysis 
of both Hanna and Mitchum. 
133. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 1972; note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
134. In In re Glenn W. Turner Enters. Litg., 521 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1975), the court 
rejected this exception to the Act as applied to an opt-out class, because such a class can be 
given its intended effect without staying state court cases. The court left open the application 
of the "authorized by Congress" exception in the case of a mandatory class. In Piambino v. 
Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. lOll (1980), the court rejected 
this exception as applied to a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 23(d) but did not ad-
dress the question whether mandatory class certification under Rule 23(b)(l) or 23(b)(2) might 
be "authorized by Congress." The majority opinion in Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982), did not discuss the possibility of this exception. 
135. 680 F.2d at ll92. 
136. This is an inherent feature of Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class certification. Judge Heaney wrote 
that 
the implication of the majority view is that mandatory classes are not truly mandatory -
any member who has previously co=enced independent litigation is somehow not sub-
ject to the ordinary rules of such class actions .... If certification in a mandatory class 
action is proper, as here it clearly is, then the ordinary rules of such actions simply pre-
clude independent litigation of class claims in state or federal courts. 
680 F.2d at ll91. 
137. FED. R. C1v. P. 22; see Note, supra note 35, at 1159-60. 
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against multiple claims, despite the procedure's inherent restraint of 
state court proceedings.138 The Federal Skywalk Cases majority re-
jected this analogy because "an uncertain claim for punitive dam-
ages against defendants who have not conceded liability . . . does 
not qualify as a limited fund." 139 This analysis assumes that because 
interpleader itself is unavailable, 140 the jurisdictional exception to 
the Anti-Injunction Act is also unavailable. But if a limited fund 
exists for Rule 23 purposes, the mandatory class procedure protects 
the jurisdiction of the court under that rule in precisely the same 
way. Future courts, following the Federal Skywalk Cases dissent, 
should look to the realities of the litigation, and recognize that prob-
able liability sufficient to create a limited fund under Rule 23 also 
brings a mandatory class within the "in aid of its jurisdiction" 
exception. 
Even granting the somewhat dubious case for retaining punitive 
damages in any circumstances, 141 the suggestion that a state might, 
by such an action, better protect its citizens against tortious injury is 
unsound; potential mass tortfeasors surely do not care by whom their 
assets are consumed when they analyze the benefits and costs of their 
behavior. 
Moreover, a federal class action does not eliminate the state's 
comparatively unimportant interest but only ensures the litigation of 
the action in a federal forum. The role of diversity jurisdiction in 
harmonizing the federal system, by directly restricting the authority 
of the state courts, negates any claim that comity requires abstention 
in mass accident cases.142 The district courts do not invoke the 
Younger doctrine whenever a defendant removes a pending action to 
the federal system. A mandatory class action does no more than re-
move pending cases from the state courts in the same manner. 
B. Mandatory Class Actions and Younger v. Harris 
If the Anti-Injunction Act does not forbid staying state court pro-
ceedings, principles of "equity, comity and federalism" may never-
138. A casual reliance on this analogy, see Note, supra note 35, at 1159-60, is unwarranted. 
Most of the cases enjoining pending state court proceedings involve statutory interpleader, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2361, which is expressly excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2361 (1976). Injunctions pursuant to statutory interpleader therefore come within the "ex-
pressly authorized by Congress" exception to the Act, and do not support an analogy based on 
the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception. 
But injunctions pursuant to Rule 22 interpleader are within the jurisdictional exception 
and provide ample support for the analogy. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.3, at 
22-37 (1982). 
139. 680 F.2d at 1182. 
140. See notes 56-57 supra. 
141. See note 46 supra. 
142. See notes 129-33 supra and accompanying text. 
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theless militate against a federal injunction. 143 In identifying when 
the doctrine applies, the Supreme Court has looked to the nature of 
the state interest involved; 144 in deciding whether the facts justify an 
exception to the doctrine when it applies, the Court has looked to 
the good faith with which the state parties have brought the action 
against which an injunction is sought.145 Both considerations sup-
port certifying a mandatory class for punitive damages in the mass-
accident context. 
1. JJoes Younger Apply? 
Younger and its immediate progeny involved injunctions that 
sought to restrain state criminal prosecutions, 146 proceedings close to 
the core of a state's legitimate interest. 147 The Supreme Court has 
expanded the doctrine's scope to encompass civil actions that resem-
ble criminal prosecutions, 148 and the lower courts have refused to 
issue injunctions, based on Younger, against actions where the state 
is not a party.149 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
declined to declare that the doctrine applies to all civil actions in 
143. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (remanding for consideration of 
Younger doctrine after holding injunction not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act). 
There is authority holding that Younger does not apply to an injunction against a civil suit 
to which the state itself is not a party. See Puerto Rico Intl. Airlines v. Silva Recio, 520 F.2d 
1342 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y 
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United States Gen., Inc. v. Arndt, 417 F. Supp, 1300 
(E.D. Wis. 1976). But the persuasive weight of authority rejects this simplistic distinction. The 
Supreme Court has never held that Younger does apply to all state court proceedings, but it 
has steadily broadened the doctrine's reach. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (child 
custody proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt proceeding); 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (state-initiated nuisance suit). Lower federal 
courts have applied the doctrine to private civil actions. See Lamb Enters. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 
1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); Louisville Area Inter-faith Comm. for United 
Farm Workers v. Nottingam Ltd., 542 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1976); Neebuhr v. Bayer, 502 F. 
Supp. 1216 (N.D. Ohio 1980). This result is more consistent with the spirit of comity underly-
ing the doctrine. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State Court 
Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 
682 (1975); Comment, Limiting the Younger Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF, L. 
REV. 1318, 1320, 1343-45 (1979). 
144. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
145. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 53-54; 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE supra note 125, § 4255, at 578 ("[T)he general under-
standing has been that to obtain relief in a case to which Younger applies there must be a 
showing of bad faith or harassment . . . ."). 
146. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
147. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion) ("the public interest in law enforcement" overrides 
claim of reporter's privilege). 
148. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (state interest in preventing welfare 
fraud); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (civil contempt action); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Younger applies to quasi-criminal public nuisance suit brought by the 
state). 
149. See note 143 supra. 
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state courts. 150 Punitive damage actions for mass accidents outside a 
federal diversity class action offer a particularly attractive candidate 
for clarifying the reservation in holding as well as dicta. 
The only state interest in separate punitive damage awards is en-
riching its own citizens at the expense of compensating other states' 
citizens, as well as many of its own, for serious injuries. 
2. Good Faith 
Viewed realistically, the pursuit of individual punitive damages 
claims at the expense of a federal class action fails to reflect good 
faith on the claimant's part. Punitive damages serve an exclusively 
public purpose. 151 The pursuit of redundant punishment results 
from the plaintiffs desire to pocket the entire windfall personally. 
Such motives scarcely qualify as "good faith." 152 Skepticism be-
comes especially justified when individuals choose to pursue their 
claims on the advice of counsel who would lose fees if the class is 
certified. 153 Abstention therefore appears inappropriate in the mass 
accident context. 
Even if federalism bars a mandatory class, the federal courts can 
take steps to minimize the burdens of multiple adjudications. First, 
the federal court should immediately enjoin, pending the certifica-
tion decision, any state proceedings not already commenced. 154 Sec-
ond, the court should certify an opt-out class action if absention or 
the Anti-Injunction Act preclude a mandatory class. 155 The class ac-
tion should then proceed as rapidly as possible, so as to minimize the 
incentive to opt out by maximizinB the chance that the class judg-
ment will consume the limited fund before an individual plaintiff 
can bring his claim to trial. 
CONCLUSION 
A court may conclude that punitive claims against a defendant 
produce one of two types of limited fund. First, applicable law may 
150. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,444 n.8 (1977) ("[W]e have no occasion 
to decide whether Younger principles apply to all civil litigation .... "). 
151. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
152. See note 22 supra and accompanying text ("an unseemly race to the courtroom door 
with monetary prizes for a few winners and worthless judgments for the rest"). 
153. See Note, supra note 35, at 1148. 
154. See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 125, § 4251, at 534 ("[T]he 
settled rule has long been that the statute applies only to injunctions against pending proceed-
ings and does not bar an injunction against the initiation of state proceedings in the future."). 
Both injunctions and declaratory relief are available from federal courts regarding threatened, 
rather than pending, state proceedings. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (perma-
nent injunction); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (declaratory relief). 
155. In Federal Skywalk Cases, for example, Judge Wright, on remand, certified an opt-out 
class. See Federal Skywalk Cases, 95 F.R.D. 483 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
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limit punitive recovery. Second, the court may obtain evidence 
showing that multiple punitive awards will bankrupt the defendant. 
In either case, early judgments for some plaintiffs will preclude puni-
tive recovery for later claimants; bankruptcy would have the addi-
tional effect of precluding the compensatory recovery of late-suing 
plaintiffs. To protect plaintiffs' interests, the court should certify a 
Rule 23(b)(l)(B) class action for punitive damages. Rule 23(b)(l)(B) 
solves the limited fund problem by joining and protecting all inter-
ested plaintiffs, by insuring that the punitive judgment against the 
defendant will be well-calibrated, and by promoting judicial econ-
omy. Moreover, a careful anaylsis of the Anti-Injunction Act and 
the Younger doctrine indicates that principles of federalism do not 
preclude this class action solution. 
